I believe MacIntyre has philosophically overstated the conflict between Aristotle and liberal modernity. Finally, MacIntyre’s own epistemic arguments commit him to an ethical pluralism that poses a practical problem for his anti-liberalism. Next I trace MacIntyre’s revolutionary negation of liberalism to non-Aristotelian sources in the British New Left and its strain of Marxism. There is no necessary link between liberalism and emotivism. In the first part I argue against MacIntyre’s assumption that liberal orders are by their very nature unable to foster Aristotelian virtues because they are hopelessly tied to an “emotivist” notion of self. In this paper I argue that MacIntyre’s claim that the adoption of Aristotle’s virtue ethics requires a radical rejection of the major institutions of liberalism is overstated. Yet some scholars also identify him as a philosophical source of radically reactionary politics and anti-liberalism. Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the world’s most influential Aristotelian political theorists.
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